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INCIDENT
Contact of Bulk Carrier Ocean Princess with Oil and Gas Production Platform SP-83A
Casualty type :ContactLocation: Gulf of Mexico, South Pass Block 83, near Pilottown, Louisiana 28°47.1’ N, 089°14.53’ WDate : January 7, 2021 Time 0122 central standard time (coordinated universal time –6 hrs)Persons on board : 24 (Ocean Princess), 0 (SP-83A)Injuries: NoneProperty damage: $1.5 million est.Environmental damage: NoneWeather Visibility : 1.75–2 nm, overcast with rain showers, winds south-southeast 29 kts, gusts 36 kts, seas 8–10 ft,
28/12/2020
Ocean Princess arrived New Orleans Louisiana with cargo of steel and magnesium ore.
6 Jan 2021 0700LT
Completed her discharge, and underway
6 Jan 2021 1506LT
Pilot disembarked, conn with Master
6 Jan 2021 1630LT
Engine stopped at open sea (Gulf of mexico) , Conn handed over to the Chief Mate, Vessel commenced drifting, Engine on 15 min notice.
As per master's night order, the plan was drift throughout the night with the engine on 15 notice. SP-83A was locating N of vessel's drifting position. Vessel was drifting towards NW direction
6 Jan 2021 2108LT
Chief mate given 15 min notice to engine room to prepare engine ready, as it was approaching the fairway.
6 Jan 2021 2115LT
The enging was ready , vessel manoeuvered awaa from the wester fairway with the master conn, OOW was 3rd officer and Mate
6 Jan 2021 2212LT
The engine stopped, vessel again begin to drift. Visibility was 2 to 3 miles, Heavy rain,
6 Jan 2021 2355LT
2nd officer releieved the 3rd officer, Master and chief mate were on the bridge.
Bridge team (master and 2 off) used S band radar, and ECDIS,Paper charts, ( X band was in standby mode.)
As the second officer focused on short range contacts, reduced the S band range from 3Nm to 1.5Nm
2nd officer informed the master that vessel drifting to 357 deg x 2.4 kts, (heading was 042 deg)
7 Jan 2021 0048LT
Chief mate left the bridge after the discussion about loading plan with the master. Mean time 2nd off informed to the master that vessel is 1 Nm from the northern fairway.
7 Jan 2021 0051LT - 0054LT
Master were busy in a phone call with office
7 Jan 2021 0051LT - 0100LT
Second officer informed master again that vessel was approaching the safety fairway and then called engine room to prepare for maneuvering. He did not plot 0100LT position in paper chart, but logged in GPS log.
7 Jan 2021 0051LT - 0110LT
Engine was ready and conn with master, Master was operationg the helm, 2 off was in telegraph.
7 Jan 2021 0051LT - 0112LT
Rudder moved hard a starboard by master, Engine was DS Ahead. Master said he was coming to course of 125 deg to clear the fairway, mean time he stated that he saw a dim yellow light, so he left helm and checked the S band radar and ECDIS, No contacts identified by master,so master thought the light was from an oil platform 5-6Nm away. The second officer investigated with binoculars, he saw light, but he could not ascertain the distance. So he checked the ECDIS thereafter , he also could not identify any contact on ECDIS, (Later he stated that he didn't check the RADAR)
7 Jan 2021 0055LT - 0120LT
As per SVDR- Master engaged in a mostly one sided conversation about non navigational, non pertinent matters with the second officer
7 Jan 2021 0121LT
The engine was increased to half ahead, As per SVDR captured the master stating it is getting closer, The master later told investigators that when he saw multiple flashing lights, he realized there was something close to the vessel off the bow. The master ran out to the starboard bridge wing.
7 Jan 2021 0122LT
The master ordered the ruder hard to starboard and the engine full ahead. Mean time vessel starboard bow struck with the platform SP 83A at 4 kts SOG.
The master ordered the rudder midships, stopped the engine, and sounded the emergency alarm. He told the chief officer via handheld radio to go to the bow and sound the tanks for flooding. After energizing a floodlight and pointing it forward, at 0127, the crew identified the object struck by the Ocean Princess as a platform (SP-83A).From 0128 to 0232, using various rudder orders and speeds, the master tried to steer away from SP-83A, but the vessel instead swung around the platform.
2ND OFF-10 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AT SEA
ROOT CAUSE 1- FATIQUE
” The master reported working on January 6 from 0600 to 1600 with a 30-minute break from 1200 to 1230. However, according to the deck log, the master was on the bridge conning the vessel at 1600, and the deck log did not indicate if the mate on watch took the conn before 1630, when the crew first stopped the engine and the Ocean Princess started to drift. After being relieved about 1630, the master’s rest period was less than 4 hours before he assumed watch in lieu of the lookouts from 2000 until the time of the contact. The work-rest history for the second officer showed that he received 13 hours of rest in the 24-hour period before the casualty.
ROOT CAUSE 2- ERROR IN ECDIS AVCS
After the casualty, the master and the second officer noted that platform SP-83A was on the paper chart used on the bridge by the mate on watch, but SP-83A did not appear on the ECDIS. The second officer stated that during the time leading up to the casualty he did not notice SP-83A was missing on the ECDIS. The paper chart used on the bridge was British Admiralty chart 3857, Southern Approaches to the Mississippi River, 5th edition, December 20, 2012. The chart was up to date and corrected with the most recent British Admiralty weekly notice to mariners.
Although the Ocean Princess ECDIS unit was up to date with chart corrections, the two ENC vector chart updates did not contain platform SP-83A, and therefore SP-83A was not shown on the Ocean Princess ECDIS unit
ROOT CAUSE 3-DISTRACTION
In addition to watchstanding duties, the master was performing other tasks while on the bridge. Before the casualty, the master was recorded on the S-VDR spending 40 minutes reviewing stability calculations for the loading plan with the mate on watch (second officer) and then the chief officer before making a phone call to the company office. Next, from about 0055 until 0120, about a minute before the casualty, the master engaged in a mostly one-sided conversation about non-navigational, non-pertinent matters with the second officer
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